The post-Chernobyl outlook for nuclear power

Nuclear plant safety

The post-Chernobyl outlook

for nuclear power

A view on responses to the accident from an international perspective

by Dr Hans Blix

In 1979, the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident had a

heavy impact on nuclear power. It made many people

sceptical of— and some even hateful — toward it. There

is no doubt that the accident slowed down growth in

nuclear power, even though an international recession —

with a less than predicted need for electricity — was the

most important factor in that slowdown.

TMI led to a large number of measures and

programmes to improve nuclear safety through

engineering devices and — even more — through better

management practices and the more competent operation

of nuclear power plants. The human factor was often in

focus.

Gradually public confidence came back in many

countries and we could see in March of this year how

some countries in Europe — Finland and the Nether-

lands — were on the verge of deciding in favour of new

nuclear power plants. We also were proud to be able to

say that 3800 reactor years of experience had been

accumulated without a single fatal radiation accident at

a commercial nuclear power plant being reported and

that there had never been an accident with large-scale

radioactive releases from such plants into the

atmosphere.

The situation is now drastically changed. The

Chernobyl accident has already cost some 31 lives, other

people are in a serious condition and many have received

radiation doses that may cause cancer and other health

problems. Land in the region around the damaged reac-

tor is contaminated, evacuated, and closed for some time

— how long we do not yet know. Indeed, some land and

vegetation far away also have been affected.

Public and political reaction

Naturally, public opinion in many countries is again

deeply concerned. Thousands of people are demonstrat-

ing against nuclear power — not for some ideological

reason but because they feel it poses unacceptable risks.

The Finnish and Dutch governments have decided to

defer any decisions on expansion of their nuclear power

programmes. Austria seems now to have decided defini-

Dr Blix is Director General of the IAEA. This article is adapted from

his address of 2 June 1986 at the European Nuclear Conference '86 in

Geneva, Switzerland.

tively against its mothballed plant at Zwentendorf. Other

governments are faced with demands — sometimes

endorsed by political parties — for the phasing out of

nuclear power.

The first position taken at a high political level was

that of the seven Western leaders meeting in Tokyo at

the 1986 economic summit in April. They declared that

"properly managed" nuclear power will continue to

produce an increasing share of the world's electricity.

Not long thereafter, the Soviet leader, Mr Gorbachyov,

declared that the future of the world economy can

"hardly be imagined" without the development of

nuclear power. The leaders of the world's strongest

countries have thus come out categorically to declare

their continued intention to rely on nuclear power. Many

other political leaders are rushing forward, however,

with demands to stop or phase out nuclear power, seek-

ing to give political form to an anxiety that they see

among voters.

Industry response

What response should come from those who con-

struct and use nuclear power stations? It is true that they

have a vested interest in the future of nuclear power.

This,

however, cannot reduce the value of their

testimony. They — more often than the average man —

live near nuclear installations and work in them. And

they — just like other people — feel concern about

increased risks of cancer and contamination. They

manifestly demonstrate their view that the risks are not

unacceptable, just like the crews flying aircrafts all

around the world.

In my view, their response, and ours, should be to

contribute as much factual information, responsible

analysis, and constructive action as possible to further

improve nuclear safety and to ensure that the conse-

quences of any nuclear accident, should one occur, are

limited with virtually no radioactive releases into the

environment. Through the visit that two colleagues and

I made to Moscow and Chernobyl after the accident, we

have tried to contribute factual information about the

recent accident and to further a joint international

programme improving nuclear safety.

We may lament — as I sometimes do — that the

media tend to come out with headlines based on almost

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Nuclear plant safety

any alarming speculation or rumour they may find and

that this often creates unnecessary anxiety in the public.

We have seen a drastic drop in bookings of flights to

Europe and of hotel rooms in Europe, a reaction that

appears to many of us here to be an absurd consequence

of exaggerated media images of terrorist and nuclear

dangers on this continent. The media will not change,

however, and we can only try to influence their report-

ing by, ourselves, contributing reliable data and respon-

sible analysis. Indeed, we have a duty to media and to

society to do so, since we often have these data and often

can make such analysis. Let me then suggest some

responses.

Perspectives and risks

First, it is legitimate in any society to discuss choices

of technologies and the question whether any of them

would entail unacceptable risks or damage. The assess-

ment of risk is not an easy matter, however, and com-

parisons of risks are even more difficult. American and

other Western analyses have assessed the risk of core

melts in the types of nuclear power stations currently

used in these countries and concluded that it is extremely

low — and so far there have been no core melts from

such stations with significant radioactivity releases to the

environment.

Following the TMI accident many new measures

were taken to reduce such risks further and the record

has shown a continuous reduction in the number of acci-

dents and incidents and an improvement in reliability.

Good safety and good economics thus go hand in hand.

Also through experiments we now know much more

about severe accident scenarios and how to manage

them.

I do not know whether similar risk assessments have

been made for Soviet reactors, but I am confident that

— especially after the Chernobyl accident — the same

kinds of searching safety analyses will take place in the

Soviet Union as we have witnessed in the West. There

is no reason to think that the Soviet Government is more

willing than others to take conscious risks with the popu-

lations of great cities.

No one should belittle the accident at Chernobyl, and

the Soviet Union itself is not doing that. But many con-

clusions should wait until we have a clearer picture of

the accident and its physical and health consequences. It

is to be welcomed that the Board of Governors of the

IAEA has decided — with Soviet agreement — to hold

a detailed expert post-accident analysis at the IAEA in

Vienna. While not every fact that is of interest will be

available at that time, many more facts than we have

now will be, and that will enable us to assess better the

scope of the accident and place it in proper perspective.

That larger perspective must, of course, include a

comparison with the risks and damage connected with

other forms of electricity generation: gas explosions,

dam bursts, and pollution from coal and oil. Radiation

releases are a unique feature of nuclear power. But is the

damage in a broader sense unique? The Chernobyl

plants generated 4000 megawatts of electricity. The

same amount of electricity produced by coal will cost a

certain number of casualties among miners and transport

workers, and through pollution it will inflict some death

or damage upon woods, lakes, land, and cities and cause

a certain number of cancer cases. And this will happen

not as a result of an accident, but under quite normal

operating circumstances. Even at an excited juncture —

perhaps especially at such a time — we must retain a

sense of proportion in our judgement.

The comparison between the consequences of using

coal and those of using nuclear power is particularly

appropriate, as we know that the future choice of energy

source for electricity production will in many cases be

limited to these two. And we know that electricity con-

sumption shows a strong tendency to increase.

We know now, though not yet in detail, what damage

nuclear power plants for electricity generation can inflict

when a large accident occurs. We must be equally aware

how much sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, and carbon

dioxide are produced by power stations generating elec-

tricity by coal or oil. To the concern we feel about their

contribution to dead forests, acid lakes, and cancer we

must now add anxiety about the possible greenhouse

effect of the carbon dioxide generation that is inevitably

linked with the burning of fossil fuel. An increasing

number of serious scientific studies indicate that we are

faced not with some theoretical but a very real problem.

Nuclear waste issue

In the comparison of risks and damage — as between

nuclear power and coal — we must not, of course,

bypass the nuclear waste issue. Before Chernobyl, pub-

lic concern was stronger on this issue than on the issue

of nuclear safety. This concern contrasts strangely with

the strong and growing consensus among scientists and

engineers that we already, have the techniques necessary

for the safe ultimate disposal of nuclear wastes and that

no major breakthroughs in technology are needed. To

convince the public of this requires that spent fuel and

waste at all levels be meticulously handled and that ade-

quate installations be planned and built. This is the job

of industry, utilities, and national authorities. It must be

speeded up.

If I may add one word from an international vantage

point, it is that industry should examine the probable

advantages achievable through economies of scale from

having fewer and larger disposal facilities, and govern-

ments should examine their possible advantages from the

viewpoint of non-proliferation. In the present climate

this may be even more difficult than before Chernobyl,

but we should not lose sight of it.

Nuclear power development

The second point I should like to make concerning a

response to Chernobyl is that, regardless of how people

IAEA BULLETIN, AUTUMN 1986

Nuclear plant safety

view the comparison between nuclear power and other

sources of energy and how they view the question of fur-

ther nuclear expansion, they know that nuclear power is

here for a long time. It follows that nuclear safety must

be good everywhere in the world and that measures must

be taken to ensure that the consequences of any nuclear

accident, should one occur, would be limited.

Let me illustrate this. Nuclear power is now provid-

ing 15% of the world's electricity supply. Before

Chernobyl we had calculated nuclear generating

capacity would be some 400 000 megawatts-electric

around 1990, by which time some 20% of world elec-

tricity generation will be accounted for by nuclear

power. It is conceivable that this figure may be affected.

The situation differs from country to country, but in

my view nuclear power is well beyond the point of no

return in many countries. In France it provides 65% of

electricity, in Switzerland 40%. Nuclear power is not a

luxury we can drop like a garment. Rather it is a reality

we shall continue to live with. The Bhopal disaster, with

some 2000 deaths, did not stop the chemical industry; it

is indispensable. And the Challenger catastrophe is not

stopping the US shuttle programme, whether indispensa-

ble or not. Nuclear power responds to very real needs

and will also not be stopped.

International measures

Having said this, however, we need to add that a

good number of measures must now be taken to avoid

another nuclear accident of this magnitude. The main

effort to ensure this will be made in individual countries

but, given the interdependence of the modern world and

the fact that nuclear clouds do not respect national

boundaries, it is not surprising that many governments

demand today that international co-operation must

guarantee that safety standards are high everywhere. A

very constructive discussion has already started, and I

was encouraged during my visit to Moscow by the fact

that the Soviet authorities were the first to urge such

international co-operation and to offer their full partici-

pation in it. Shortly thereafter the Board of Governors

of the IAEA met in special session and, having discussed

a number of ideas advanced by the Secretariat, gave

directions on several concrete points, and specific

proposals for adoption will be considered.

What, concretely, do we propose?

A number of measures would seek to remedy certain

weaknesses in international collaboration that we have

seen in the Chernobyl case. A multilateral convention is

needed on early warning following any nuclear accident

that might have transboundary effects. Had such an

instrument and related internal implementing provisions

existed in this case, the information needed by neigh-

bours would probably have been forthcoming. They

would have been alerted earlier and could have taken

some precautions. Another multilateral convention,

aimed at providing ready machinery for emergency

assistance also is being proposed. While the Soviet

Union and other States with large nuclear programmes

may be less in need of such assistance, many countries

with smaller nuclear programmes might be more

dependent upon it. Also we need a global network that

will continuously transmit figures about levels of radia-

tion in various parts of the world so as to enable authori-

ties to take proper action. And there needs to be

harmonization of different countries' regulations con-

cerning intervention levels. The response we have seen

in the past weeks was very heterogeneous. Many coun-

tries — and especially developing countries — need

assistance in improving their capability to monitor radio-

activity and in formulating safety regulations.

All these measures, useful and necessary as they are,

have in common that they address the type of problems

just confronted. We should be better prepared if radioac-

tive releases were to recur. We hope they do not.

Of a different kind are measures that will further

reduce the risk of future accidents occurring and reduce

the risk of radioactive releases in any accident that does

occur. Let me discuss the latter case first.

Given that we can never reduce to zero the risk of a

severe accident at a nuclear power plant, and that the

risk could become reality again tomorrow, accident

management and limitation are vitally important. Much

has been learned in this regard since TMI and the lessons

need to be further discussed and disseminated. We need,

in particular, I think, arrange for discussions of such

features as strong containment buildings, big filters out-

side containment buildings tcrtrap radioactive releases

that would otherwise escape into the environment, and

recombiners to avoid hydrogen buildup.

Safety standards, inspections

To reduce further the risk of accidents occurring, a

number of measures can be taken internationally. In the

light of TMI and Chernobyl the question has been raised

by some governments whether parts of the IAEA

Nuclear Safety Standards (NUSS) should be reviewed

and updated. There also is the more far-reaching ques-

tion whether some of these standards can be transformed

into generally binding minimum rules. The main argu-

ment, which is a convincing one, is that radioactivity

does not respect national boundaries, national sovereign-

ties.

Rules ensuring the safe use of large-scale nuclear

activities should therefore be worked out internationally

and accepted to apply everywhere. Such rules must not,

of course, relieve national governments of their fun-

damental responsibility for nuclear safety — only

require of them that they apply certain standards. They

are the repositories of legislative and executive power

and are responsible vis-a-vis their citizens.

Obligatory international safety inspections of nuclear

installations — a parallel to safeguards — are not likely

to be introduced. However, a pragmatic approach by

governments might result in a much larger number of

invitations for international teams to review the safety of

nuclear power stations. For some time now the IAEA

IAEA BULLETIN, AUTUMN 1986

Nuclear plant safety

has been sending

out

such teams (called Operational

Safety Review Teams,

ART)

at the

request

Member States. Governments

may

wish

have more

such international verification

of the

safety

nuclear

power plants

their territories,

order

satisfy both

internal opinion

and

neighbouring countries.

I shall

go no

further

cataloguing possible safety

measures,

but I

would mention, lastly, that,

in my

view,

increased attention should

devoted

to the

next genera-

tion

nuclear reactors having greater intrinsic safety.

The less forgiving

the

public

and

authorities

are

vis-a-vis

nuclear installations

— and no one can

blame them

for

taking

the

view that Chernobyl type accidents

are

unac-

ceptable

— the

more forgiving, fool

proof,

reactor

designs must

be. And the

sooner

we see

such designs

operation,

the

better.

Nuclear power

and

non-proliferation

I hesitate somewhat

turn

another subject than

Chernobyl

and

nuclear safety,

but

this accident

is not the

only thing that

affecting

the

acceptability

nuclear

power

in the

world. Besides

the

economics

nuclear

power, there

are the

non-proliferation aspects, which

many

may

view

as a

mine field into which technicians,

scientists,

and

business people should

not

stray.

view, however,

that

you

should

fully aware

them,

for

they very directly affect

the

world

nuclear

power.

Part

of the

opposition

nuclear power stems from

the view

—

held

some

—

that more nuclear power

inevitably means more nuclear-weapon States. Further-

more, restrictions that impede international nuclear

trade have their origin,

to a

great extent,

in non-

proliferation concerns.

The

nuclear industry accordingly

has very direct reasons

interest itself

in the

problem

of nuclear proliferation, more particularly

what

can

be done

reduce even further

the

risks

proliferation.

What

is the

problem?

The basic contention that experience

in the

civilian

nuclear field

may be of

assistance

to a

State bent

making nuclear weapons cannot

rejected, even

though

all the

existing nuclear-weapon States first

developed nuclear weapons

and

only then went

for

nuclear power. Also,

must

recognized that nuclear

weapons technology

sufficiently well known today

for

any State with

developed industrial

and

scientific

infrastructure

manufacture such weapons,

if it is pre-

pared

devote

the

necessary time

and

resources

their

manufacture.

The

denial

nuclear technology

to a non-

nuclear-weapon State

may

certainly retard

programme

for

the

manufacture

nuclear weapons,

but

such denial

does

not

raise

insuperable barrier.

The

first

and

fore-

most barrier

horizontal proliferation thus lies

in the

political will

governments

forego

the

nuclear

weapons option

and

their readiness

enter commit-

ments

that effect.

How

this political will

to be

stimulated

and

main-

tained?

shall

not

tire

you

with

long discussion

of the

importance

for

this question

such matters

nuclear

disarmament measures

and

security arrangements.

But I

would like

remind

you

that, while opponents

nuclear power

are

likely

contend that

the

spread

nuclear science

and

technology

further countries

raises

proliferation risk,

the

basic approach during

30 years

effort

has

been

make nuclear material

and

technology available

return

for

non-proliferation

commitments

and the

verification

compliance with

those commitments.

The

question

has not

been whether

nuclear technology should spread

or not

spread

in the

world.

The

question

has

been whether

spreads through

national endeavours without non-proliferation commit-

ments

through international transfers coupled with

non-proliferation commitments.

It is

fair

to say

that this

"Atoms

for

Peace" approach

has

been reasonably

successful

— at

least

if we

compare

the

situation-

now

with what many people once feared.

The

number

nuclear-weapon States

has for

many years remained

five, far less than

was

feared. However, this

is no

reason

for complacency.

Today,

the

single most effective measure

support

of non-proliferation might well

be an

agreement

on a

complete nuclear test

ban. A

number

States that have

far not

been willing

adhere

to the

Treaty

on the

Non-Proliferation

Nuclear Weapons

(NPT)

might

prove

to be

willing

complete nuclear test

ban,

thereby

not

only impeding

further qualitative nuclear

arms race between nuclear-weapon States,

but

also

depriving themselves

of the

possibility

testing even

nuclear explosive devices.

While, regrettably, non-proliferation stimulants

this magnitude have

so far

been lacking,

it is to be

welcomed that

the

parties

to the NPT at

last year's

Review Conference succeeded

adopting

consensus

declaration

ways

and

means

strengthening

the

treaty.

The

declaration underlines

the

crucial role that

States parties

to the NPT

ascribe

to the

safeguards

system operated

by the

IAEA. While

the

political will

States

expressed

non-proliferation pledges, verifi-

cation

compliance with those pledges

—

which

vital

for confidence

—

comes through safeguards.

It is no

exaggeration

to say

that without safeguards international

nuclear trade would

crippled.

Let

conclude

saying that

it is

gratifying that

the

nuclear industry, which

on the

whole

was

rather luke-

warm towards

the

conclusion

of the NPT and the

emergence

of the

safeguards system,

has

come around

fully supporting these institutions.

submission

that

has

very good reasons

for

doing

so.

Enlightened

self-

interest should prompt

the

industry

contribute actively

and constructively

to the

smooth functioning

of the

safeguards system

and to the

non-proliferation effort.

The non-proliferation aspect

may not

impress some

as being

decisive

question

for

nuclear power

safety. However,

it is

when things

wrong that

discover

how

important they

are. Let us

make sure that

the

future neither safety

nor

non-proliferation will

wrong.

IAEA BULLETIN, AUTUMN

1986